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Kandies v. Polk
385 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2004)

L Facts
In April 1994 a North Carolina jury foundJeffrey Clayton Kandies guilty of
the first-degree rape and first-degree murder of his fiancee's four-year-old
daughter, Natalie Lynn Osborne.' During the sentencing phase of the trial, the
defense called witnesses, including Kandies's mother, who testified about Kandies's good parenting, his history of drug and alcohol abuse, his relatively clean
criminal record, his difficult childhood, and his relationship with his step-father.2
In addition, the defense called two clinical psychologists, Dr. Brian Glover and
Dr. Claudia Coleman.3 Dr. Glover, who had met with Kandies three times, testified that Kandies had a severe alcohol problem and that on the day of the crime
"Kandies was suffering from a mental disorder and that his ability to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct was impaired." 4 Dr. Coleman met with Kandies
twice and testified that she conducted psychological tests and reviewed his work,
school, military, and police records.' Dr. Coleman opined that Kandies's judgment on the day of the crime may have been impaired by his various emotional
and mental disturbances and alcohol dependence.6 Jurors found two aggravating
7
factors as well as three statutory and eighteen non-statutory mitigating factors.

1.
Kandies v. Polk, 385 F.3d 457, 461-64 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 464-65, 464 n.2.
2.
3.
Id. at 464.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.at 464-65.
6.
Id. at 465.
7.
Kandes, 385 F.3d at 465; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (2003) (instructing jurors to
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether a death sentence is appropriate). The two aggravating factors were: "(1) Kandies murdered Natalie during the commission
of first-degree rape and (2) the murder of Natalie was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 465; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (listing possible aggravating circumstances). The statutory mitigating factors were: "(1) Kandies did not have a significant criminal
history; (2) Kandies murdered Natalie while suffering from a mental or emotional disturbance; and
(3) Kandies's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements
of the law was impaired." Kandes, 385 F.3d at 465 n.4; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (listing
statutory mitigating circumstances). The eighteen non-statutory mitigating circumstances primarily
involved Kandies's remorse, his cooperation with authorities, his history of substance abuse, and
his difficult childhood. Kandies,385 F.3d at 465 n.5; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(f) (permitting
jurors to consider mitigating circumstances other than those listed in the statute).
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The jury concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating factors and,
consequently, sentenced Kandies to death.'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Kandies's conviction and
sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' In September
1997 Kandies filed a postconviction motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") in
the trial court, which asserted that, inter alia, his trial counsel were ineffective
because they failed to investigate whether he was sexually abused as a child.10
The MAR court denied Kandies's ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") claim
and his other claims, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately denied
Kandies's petition for further review of the merits of his claims." In October
1999 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
denied Kandies's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' Subsequently, the United
States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appeal3
ability.'
II. Holding
A majority of the three-member Fourth Circuit panel reviewed the state
court's findings under the standards set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and held that the state court's decisions
regarding Kandies's IAC claim were neither " 'contrary to, [n]or involved an
unreasonable application of' "Strickland v. Washington.'4 Specifically, two judges

8. Kandies, 385 F.3d at 465.
9. Id. at 466; State v. Kandies, 467 S.E.2d 67, 88 (N.C. 1996), cert. denied,519 U.S. 894, 894
(1996); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (giving the Supreme Court of North Carolina automatic
review of all death sentences).
10.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 466; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411 (2003) (permitting a defendant
to file an MAR to seek post-trial relief from an error committed by the trial court). In support of
his claim, Kandies submitted an affidavit that described the sexual abuse he suffered as a child.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 466.
11.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 466-67.
12.
Id. at 467.
13.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring a defendant to obtain a COA before
appealing a district court's denial of the defendant's habeas petition, if the petition's claims arise out
of state court; part ofAEDPA); see also 4TH CIR. R. 22(a) (providing the Fourth Circuit's procedures
for requesting a certificate of appealability). Seegeneralby Maxwell C. Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.
J. 635 (2004) (analyzing 4TH CIR. R. 22(a)). The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability
on his JAC claim and his claim that the prosecution exercised racially based peremptory strikes in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky. Kandies, 385 F.3d at 467; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84
(1986) (prohibiting the prosecution from striking a juror solely on the basis of race). The Fourth
Circuit denied Kandies's Batson claim, and the issue will not be discussed in this case note. Kandies,
385 F.3d at 478.
14.
Kandes, 385 F.3d at 467-68, 478-79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000)); see Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-98 (1984) (providing a two-part test to determine whether trial
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concluded that the state court reasonably determined that Kandies's counsel did
not err by failing to retain a mitigation expert or by failing to inquire into
Kandies's childhood sexual abuse."5 Although one judge did find counsel's
failure to explore the issue of sexual abuse to be unreasonable, all three judges
concluded that the state court reasonably determined that counsel's performance,
if deficient, did not prejudice Kandies."6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Kandies's habeas petition.17
Ill. Ana~sis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In assessing whether the state court reasonably determined Kandies's IAC
claim, Judge Gregory first reiterated Stricklands two-part IAC test.' Stricklands
first prong requires defendants to show "that defense counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, the proper measure of which is
prevailing professional norms."' 9 In capital cases, counsel must thoroughly
investigate the defendant's background but need not investigate every possible
avenue of mitigation if it is unlikely to assist the defendant at sentencing." In
assessing the adequacy of counsel's investigation, courts review whether the
investigation was adequate under professional norms in that par-ticular case
viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of trial.2 Sticklanads second prong
requires a defendant to show "that he or she was prejudiced by defense counsel's
objectively unreasonable performance." ' A defendant may establish prejudice
in capital sentencing by showing" 'a reasonable probability that atleast onejuror'"
would have voted differently if not for trial counsel's defective performance.23
counsel was ineffective and, if so, whether trial counsel's errors require reversal). AEDPA only
permits a federal court to overturn a state court's decision when it is" 'contrary to, or involve[s] an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States,"' or it is" 'based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Kandies, 385 F.3d at 467 (quoting 28 U.S.C. S
2254(d) (2004)); see28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (providing the standard of review for federal habeas
petitions challenging state court decisions; part of AEDPA).
15.
Kan&es, 385 F.3d at 478; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 488-490 (Traxler, J., concurring).
16.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 471-72; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 481 (Michael,J., concurring); Kanaies, 385
F.3d at 490 (Traxler, J., concurring).
17.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 478-79.
18.
Id. at 468-69; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98 (providing a two-part IAC test).
19.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 468 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
20.
Id.at 469; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003) ("[Wie emphasize that Strickland
does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how
unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.").
21.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 469 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523).
22.
Id. at 468 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
23.
Id. at 468-69 (quoting Viggins, 539 U.S. at 537).
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Stricklands prejudice prong requires courts to" 'reweigh the evidence in aggravadon against the totality of available mitigating evidence,'" yet remain deferential
to trial counsel's decisions.2 4
Kandies asserted that his counsel were ineffective under Stricklani?s first
prong because they failed to obtain a mitigation expert and failed to inquire
specifically into whether Kandies was sexually abused as a child." Regarding
counsel's failure to obtain a mitigation expert,Judge Gregory rejected any 'per se
rule requiring defense counsel to retain a mitigation expert in every capital
case."26 Courts must give trial counsel discretion to pursue different avenues in
investigating mitigation and refrain from adopting a "rigid checklist" for defense
attorneys incapital cases. 7 Further,Judge Gregory noted that investigation techniques, such as interviewing family and friends, can be as effective as a mitigation
specialist in preparing a convincing mitigation case.2" Thus, Judge Gregory rejected Kandies's contention that the failure to retain a mitigation expert constituted IAC. 9
Kandies next contended that his trial counsel were ineffective because they
failed to explore the issue of sexual abuse.3" At trial, no witness testified that
Kandies's uncle sexually abused the defendant as a child.3 Kandies argued that
studies that show people who commit acts of child abuse are very likely to have
been abused as children should have alerted counsel to the possibility of childhood sexual abuse.32 Judge Gregory first recounted trial counsel's thorough
mitigation investigation, which included extensive interviews with Kandies's
family and friends as well as the retention of two psychologists who met with
Kandies on numerous occasions.33 The retention of the two psychologists was
important in assessing the decision not to investigate sexual abuse even though
Kandies's counsel asked one to focus on substance abuse, and the other to
24.
Id. (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534).
25.
Id.at 469-70. Kandies also asserted that his counsel were ineffective because the attorney
assigned to develop mitigation evidence, Scott N. Dunn, was too inexperienced to try a capital case.
Id.at 469 n.7. Although Dunn had never tried a criminal case, Judge Gregory noted that inexperience does not establish per se ineffectiveness; rather, a court must examine the attorney's actual
performance. Id. Although Judge Gregory treated this claim in a footnote,Judge Traxler discussed
the issue slightly more in depth. Id.; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 488 (TraxlerJ., concurring).
26.
Kandes, 385 F.3d at 470.
27.
Id.; see Strickland,466 U.S. at 688-89 ("No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.").
28.
Kandles, 385 F.3d at 470.
29.
Id.at 469-70.
30.
Id.at 470.
31.
Id.at 464-65.
32.
Id.at 470.
33.
Id.at 471.
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34
screen for brain damage, and not specifically to look for past sexual abuse.
Because no interviewee or psychologist mentioned the sexual abuse, counsel did
not fail to discover the past sexual abuse "due to a half-hearted investigation into
Kandies's background."3 Judge Gregory asserted that an investigation's reasonableness largely depends upon information conveyed by the defendant and,
accordingly, counsel's investigation was reasonable because nothing in their
36
investigation should have alerted them to the sexual abuse. Thus, the state
court reasonably determined that counsel's performance did not fall "below an
objective37 standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional
norms."
In addition to determining that counsel's performance did not fail Stricklands first prong, Judge Gregory also concluded that the state court reasonably
found that Kandies had not established that "at least one juror would have
weighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence differently had the jury been
informed" about the sexual abuse. 38 The addition of childhood sexual abuse to
the previously found twenty-one mitigating factors did not convince Judge
Gregory that the mitigating factors outweighed either aggravating factor enough
to cause a reasonable juror to change his or her mind.39 In coming to this
conclusion, the judge highlighted the vileness of the crime and Kandies's lies
about the crime in the days after the murder. 4'
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Michael disagreed with the panel
majority and argued that counsel's performance was deficient under Stricklands
first prong.4 However, Judge Michael agreed that Kandies's counsel's performance did not prejudice Kandies enough to satisfy Stricklands second prong and,
42
accordingly, concurred in the denial of Kandies's habeas petition. Regarding
the deficiency of counsel's performance, Judge Michael noted that any decision
not to investigate must be reasonable under the particular circumstances of the
case.43 The American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and

34.

Kand&es, 385 F.3d at 471.

35.

Id.

36.
Id.at 471 n.8; see Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971,979-80(4th Cir. 1995) (finding that
counsel "may rely on the truthfulness of his client and those whom he interviews in deciding how
to pursue his investigation").
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 471 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
37.
38.
Id. at 471-72.
Id. at 472.
39.
See id. ("I am not convinced that the jury ... would not have sentenced Kandies to death
40.
after having found him guilty of the rape and murder of his fiancee's four-year-old daughter...
dumping her body in a plastic bag and then lying about the incident for a couple of days.").
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 479 (Michael, J., concurring).
41.
Id.
42.
Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
43.

CAPITAL DEFENSEJOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2

Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ("ABA Guidelines") instruct
counsel to " '[clollect information relevant to the sentencing phase of trial,
including, but not limited to: ...family and social history (including physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse).'"" Judge Michael determined that counsel's failure
to inquire into an area recommended by the ABA Guidelines indicated a deficient
performance." Counsel's failure to investigate sexual abuse, despite studies that
show men who sexually abuse were often sexually abused themselves, also
supported his conclusion regarding counsel's ineffectiveness.46 Further, Judge
Michael rejected the contention that counsel did not need to inquire into sexual
abuse because it had not surfaced in interviews with family members or psychiatrists."7 Counsel must conduct mitigation investigation with specificity, and
extensive investigation into some areas does not make up for deficiencies in
other areas."
Judge Traxler also concurred and addressed each part of Kandies's IAC
claim."9 First, Judge Traxler rejected Kandies's assertions that one of his attorneys, Scott Dunn, was ineffective because he was too inexperienced and that his
inexperience resulted in the failure to obtain a mitigation expert as recommended
by the ABA Guidelines.5" In assessing IAC claims, the issue is the adequacy of
the actual representation and not the attorney's experience.5 Further, the failure
to obtain a mitigation expert was not ineffective because counsel compensated
for the lack of a mitigation expert with what Judge Traxler viewed as a thorough
mitigation investigation. 2
Additionally, Judge Traxler concluded that the state court reasonably
determined that defense counsel met their duty of conducting a reasonable
mitigation investigation despite their failure to explore Kandies's past sexual
abuse. 3 Counsel's investigation was sufficient in light of their extensive interviews with family members and retention of well-qualified experts.5" Further,
44.

Id. (quoting A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF

COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1 (D)(2) (1989)).
45.
Id.; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American
Bar Association standards and the like.., are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they
are only guides.").
46.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 480 (MichaelJ, concurring).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 480-81.
49.
Kan'es, 385 F.3d at 481-503 (Traxler, J., concurring).
50.
Id. at 488; see A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 4.1 (Rev. Ed. 2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES] (recommending that proper capital defense teams contain mitigation experts).
51.
Kandes, 385 F.3d at 488 (Traxler, J., concurring).
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 489-90.
54.
Id.
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counsel are not per se ineffective for failing to inquire into childhood sexual
abuse in any case involving child molestation."5 Finally,Judge Traxler concluded
that the state court reasonably determined that counsel's performance did not
prejudice Kandies because the viciousness of the crime and the twenty-one
separate mitigating circumstances made it unlikely that a juror would reach a
different decision after learning about the sexual abuse. 56
IV. Application in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Kandies sheds additional light on the level of
performance that courts will consider adequate under Strickland's first prong.
Since Strickland, courts have increasingly used the ABA Guidelines in assessing
whether an attorney's performance was objectively reasonable under Stricklands
first prong.57 Particularly, the Court in Wiggins v. SmithP8 employed the ABA
Guidelines and the state's prevailing professional norms to determine that
59
counsel had a duty to investigate "all reasonably available mitigating evidence."
The ABA Guidelines specifically recommend that capital defense counsel hire a
mitigation expert and investigate their client's history for sexual abuse. 60 However, despite these recommendations, Judges Traxler and Gregory reiterated that
the ABA Guidelines are not "rigid checklist[s]" to evaluate counsel's performance
and determined that counsel were adequate despite their failure to hire a mitigation expert and their failure to explore the issue of sexual abuse.6'
Rejecting Kandies's claim that the failure to obtain a mitigation specialist is
per se IAC, Judges Traxler and Gregory noted that counsel can compensate for
the lack of a mitigation expert with a thorough investigation into the defendant's
background.62 The court seemed to discount a mitigation expert's importance
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 491-92.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 (noting that the ABA Guidelines serve as guides to
57.
determining whether counsel performed reasonably). See also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (relying
primarily on the ABA standards in determining that reviewing a capital defendant's social history
was a prevailing professional norm); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing the ABA
standards in determining that counsel had a duty to investigate thoroughly a defendant's background).
58.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
59.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1(C) (1989)).
60.
ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 50, § 4.1(A)(1), § 10.7 Cmt. (recommending that defense
teams hire a mitigation specialist and explore their client's social history for sexual abuse).
61.
See Kandies, 385 F.3d at 470 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (noting that Strickland
rejected adopting any rigid checklist to evaluate counsel's performance); Kandies, 385 F.3d at 488
(Traxler,J., concurring) (rejecting Kandies's contention that the ABA Guidelines require that capital
defense counsel hire a mitigation expert).
62.
See Kandies,385 F.3d at 470 ("While the retention of a mitigation expert in these instances

CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2

and assumed that an attorney could obtain as much information in an interview
with a family member as a mitigation specialist could.63 Yet, the ABA Guidelines
note that "[m]itigation specialists possess clinical and information-gathering skills
and training that most lawyers simply do not have.",64 Further, it is unlikely that
an attorney will have the time to compile a complete social history of the defendant that a proper mitigation case requires. 65 Kandies highlights the importance
of a mitigation expert because a properly trained mitigation expert could probably have detected that Kandies had been sexually abused as a child.
Additionally, Judges Traxler and Gregory concluded that counsel's failure
to explore the issue of sexual abuse did not render their performance
inadequate.66 Both judges came to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that
Kandies's offense involved the rape of a child and that studies have shown that
people convicted of sexual abuse are likely to have been sexually abused as
children. 67 The failure to follow up on such a lead recalls defense counsel's
performance in Wiggins, in which the attorneys failed to follow up on social
service reports that indicated the need to conduct further investigation. 6' Although the Court in Wiggins recognized that counsel does not need to investigate
every possible avenue of mitigation, the Court did not tolerate counsel's failure
to investigate when information available to the attorney indicated that a particu-

may nonetheless be advisable, I do not believe defense counsel should be required, or feel compelled, to do so."); Kandies, 385 F.3d at 488 n.2 (Traxler, J., concurring) (finding that Kandies's
counsel's failure to obtain a mitigation expert did not render their performance ineffective). Note
that currently, Capital Defender Units ("CDU' in the state of Virginia have access to mitigation
specialists as part of the defense team. See Daniel L. Payne, Buihng the Casefor DLfe: A Mitigation
Spedah'stas a Necessiy and a Matter ofRigbt, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 43, 59 (2003) ("The lead attorney at each
CDU has determined that all defendants represented by the CDU attorney will also have access to
the assistance of the CDU's fact investigator and the mitigation specialist.").
63.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 470 ("[Tlhere will be some circumstances where the assistance of lay
persons, such as family, friends and colleagues, is more useful in discovering and presenting

mitigating evidence than that of a mitigation expert.").
64. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 50, § 4.1 Cmt.
65. See id.(noting that a mitigation specialist's duties include "compil[ing] a comprehensive
and well-documented psycho-social history of the client . .. analyz[ing] the significance of the
information in terms of impact on development... identif[ying] the need for expert assistance;
assist[ing] inlocating appropriate experts; [and] provid[ing] social history information to experts").
66. Kandies, 385 F.3d at 471; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 489-90 (TraxlerJ., concurring).
67. See Kandies, 385 F.3d at 470 (noting that numerous studies show that people who sexually
abuse children are likely to have been sexually abused as children); ABA GUIDELINES, supra note
50, § 10.7 Cmt. ("Counsel needs to explore.., family and social history (including physical, sexual
or emotional abuse... ).').
68.
See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524-25 (noting that the DSS records in counsel's hands would
have revealed that Wiggins's "mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster
home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; [and] he had frequent,
lengthy absences from school').
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lar avenue may be fruitful.69 Thus, it is hard to reconcile Judges Traxler and
Gregory's opinions regarding counsel's failure to explore the issue of sexual
abuse with the Court's reasoning in Wiggins.
In discussing counsel's failure to explore the issue of sexual abuse, Judges
Traxler and Gregory repeatedly credited counsel's retention of the expert psychologists as a reason why counsel performed adequately even though Kandies's
counsel did not hire the experts to investigate Kandies's social history nor did
they direct the expert's attention to the possibility of sexual abuse.7" Among the
issues pending in Rompilla v. Beard' is whether the state court reasonably determined that counsel was sufficient when he hired a psychiatrist and forensic
psychologist to assist the defense but did not provide them with any of
Rompilla's records.72 Although Rompilla's past was filled with potentially
mitigating evidence, the lack of information provided to the experts caused them
to miss most of it.73 Thus, the United States Supreme Court's forthcoming
decision in Rompilla may clarify what an attorney must do beyond retaining mental health experts in order to render adequate assistance under Strickland.
Finally, each judge agreed that counsel's errors did not prejudice Kandies
because the circumstances of the offense made death a likely sentence and the
jury had already found twenty-one total mitigating factors.74 The court's opinion
reveals a persistent problem with Stricklands second prong: courts are unlikely
to find that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant whether counsel presented
an otherwise strong case for mitigation or a weak one.75 Generally, courts find
prejudice in this context only when the evidence that was not uncovered due to
counsel's error was exceptionally powerful and when counsel presented a very
weak mitigation case at trial.76

69.
Id.at 533-34.
70.
See, e.g., Kandies, 385 F.3d at 471 (explaining that counsel's performance was adequate
because they had obtained two expert psychologists to investigate Kandies's background).
71.
125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
72.
Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233,240 (3rd Cir. 2004); see Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 27,
27 (2004) (granting Rompilla's petition for a writ of certiorari).
73.
Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 240-44.
74. Kanaies, 385 F.3d at 471-72; Kan&es, 385 F.3d at 481 (Michael,J., concurring); Kandies, 385
F.3d at 490-92 (Traxler, J., concurring).
75.
SeeKand'es, 385 F.3d at 471-72 (finding no prejudice because of the plethora of mitigation
evidence already before the jury); Kuiken v. Lee, No. 94-6023, 1995 WL 224045, at *2-*3 (4th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1995) (finding that counsel's failure to introduce certain character evidence in mitigation
did not prejudice the defendant when there was no other evidence in mitigation).
76.
See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-38 (explaining that the evidence that trial counsel failed
to uncover was particularly powerful and that the only mitigating evidence presented to the jury was
that Wiggins had no prior convictions).
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. Conclusion
Of the three Fourth Circuit judges writing opinions in Kandies, two determined that the state court reasonably decided that Kandies's counsel's performance was sufficient under Strickland's first prong.77 Specifically, Judges Traxler
and Gregory concluded that counsel's performance in this child-rape and murder
case was adequate despite their failure to explore whether Kandies himself was
sexually abused as a child." Further, all three judges determined that given the
plethora of mitigating evidence available to the jury and the gruesomeness of the
crime, counsel's performance, if inadequate, did not prejudice the defendant
under Strickland's second prong.79

Justin B. Shane

77.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 469-71; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 490 (Traxler, J., concurring).
78.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 469-71; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 488-90 (TraxlerJ., concurring).
79.
Kandies, 385 F.3d at 472; Kandies, 385 F.3d at 481 (Michael, J., concurring); Kandies, 385
F.3d at 490 (Traxler, J., concurring).

